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A COMPARISON OF DRINKING AND DRIVING LAW
IN NORWAY AND NORTH DAKOTA:
MORE THAN A DIFFERENCE IN PENALTIES
THOMAS M. LOCKNEY*
The problem of drinking drivers is of concern in both Norway and
the United States. Norway is world famous for the originality and strict-
ness of its law and practice regulating the problem and is the birthplace
of the "Scandinavian model."l Professor Johannes Andenaes described
the main features of the Scandinavian model as a tripartite system
involving 1) "per se" legislation that prohibits driving with more than a
specified amount of alcohol in the blood (blood alcohol concentration
or "BAC"); 2) strict enforcement by police, primarily through breath
and blood alcohol tests and random roadside checks; and 3) stiff
sanctions. This Article undertakes to compare this system with the
American approach to the same problem.
One difficulty with comparing Norwegian and American law and
practice is the American federal system, which has traditionally relegated
primary responsibility for traffic regulation to the individual states.2 In
recent years, pressure from the United States federal government has
reduced the diversity of state laws affecting drunk driving, but the
differences among them are still significant, 3 comparable perhaps to
* Professor of Law, The University of North Dakota School of Law, Grand Forks, North Dakota;
Municipal Judge, Emerado and Larimore, North Dakota; L.L.M., 1974, Harvard University, Cain-
bridge, Massachusetts; J.D., 1970, University of Texas, Austin; B.A., 1967, University of Wisconsin,
Madison.
This article has grown out of experience teaching in and administering the University of North
Dakota Summer School in Norway. The summer school is part of the exchange program conducted
since 1982 between the University of North Dakota and the University of Oslo, Norway. In addition,
the author teaches comparative law seminars at the University of North Dakota in which Norwegian
and North American law students work together on comparative law projects. Since this long period
of time includes many valuable contributions from many people in both Norway and the United States,
the list of individual contributions would unduly lengthen this footnote. I hope that the colleagues,
research assistants, and students who contributed to my learning will accept this collective thanks and
forgive both the absence of their individual names and the publication of evidence that I either didn't
understand or didn't agree with all they tried to teach.
1. Johannes Andens, The Scandinavian Experience, in SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE DRINKING DRIVER
43 (Michael D. Laurence et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter SOCIAL CONTROL].
2. Michael D. Laurence, The Legal Context in the United States, in SOCIAL CONTROL, supra note 1,
at 136-37.
3. Laurence provides subsections entitled "The Growing Federal Presence," "Diffusion and Uni-
formity in State Level Policies," and "The Future of Decentralized Policy-Making," and he explains
the diversity among the states and the increased participation of the federal government. Laurence,
supra note 2, at 142-52. Laurence describes succinctly the combination of "encouragement" of states
to comply with federal standards, in the form of threats to withhold federal highway funds, and
financial "carrots," consisting of federal funding of state programs, used to create the increased
federal influence on state traffic law and policy. Laurence, supra note 2, at 147-49.
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those between Norway and its Nordic neighbors. Therefore, this Article
will use the law of North Dakota, where the author lives and works, as a
representative system. This should allow for a sufficiently detailed and
comprehensive, yet readable, comparative picture of driving under the
influence law and practice.
Although there are a variety of types of "drunk driving" in both
Norway and North Dakota, the North Dakota custom of abbreviating the
offenses generally as "DUI," standing for driving under the influence
of alcohol, 4 will be used throughout the remaining discussion, except
where more discriminating terminology is appropriate. 5 Furthermore,
although both Norway and North Dakota prohibit driving under the in-
fluence of other drugs or substances, 6 the vast majority of reported cases
involve alcohol, and this discussion will therefore be limited to an analy-
sis of alcohol cases to avoid complications posed by other substances.
It is reasonable to characterize North Dakota's DUI laws as modem
and progressive, measured by American standards.7 Although it would
4. There is little uniformity among the various states regarding alcohol related terminology. See
Editor's Introduction, in SOCIAL CONTROL, supra note 1, at xvii. "Drunk driving is grammatically
awkward, but is a convenient shorthand term" and is "standard parlance in the popular press."
Editor's Introduction, supra, at xvii. "The American acronyms DUI (driving under the influence) and
DWI (driving while intoxicated) have a precise legal and technical meaning within a given state in the
absence of common federal standards." Editor's Introduction, supra, at xvii.
5. North Dakota has four levels of driving under the influence offenses. See N.D. CENT. CODE §
39-08-01(1) (1997 & Supp. 1999). Section 39-08-01(1), the DUI statute, provides, in pertinent part:
A person may not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a
highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for
vehicular use in this state if any of the following apply:
I. That person has an alcohol concentration of at least ten one-hundredths of one
percent by weight at the time of a chemical test within two hours after the driving or
being in actual physical control of a vehicle.
II. That person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
III. That person is under the influence of any drug or substance or combination of drugs
or substances to a degree which renders that person incapable of safely driving.
IV. That person is under the combined influence of alcohol and any other drugs or
substances to a degree which renders that person incapable of safely driving.
Id.
6. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(l)(c) & (d); Vegtrafikkloven [The Road Traffic Act] § 22. Nor-
wegian legal writers would refer to the appropriate section, which prohibits driving when "ptvirket av
alkohol (iikke edru) eller annet berusende eller bedovende middel" or "affected by alcohol (not
sober) or other intoxicating or stupefacient substance," as § 22, 1. ledd. Section 22 consists, in Norwe-
gian, of two paragraphs, with no numerical or other subdividing. "1. ledd" refers to the first para-
graph. Further citations in this article to Norwegian statutes with unnumbered or lettered paragraphs
or subsections will either refer only to the section itself, or will appear as follows, using § 22 as an
example: § 22.1 to refer to § 22's first paragraph; § 22.2 to refer to § 22's second paragraph, and so
on. English speaking readers who are fortunate enough someday to discuss legal topics with Norwe-
gian lawyers should be forewarned that "§," to which we in the United States refer as "section," is in
Norwegian referred to as "paragraph" or, in Norwegian, "paragraf," with obvious potential for
confusion. All translations from Norwegian to English in this article are by the author unless otherwise
noted.
7. However, Mothers against Drunk Driving (MADD) recently gave North Dakota a D+ when
compared to other states on the organization's annual report card on drunk driving enforcement and
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be pleasant to credit North Dakota's relatively advanced status to the
well-recognized and strong influence of its Norwegian settlers, other
factors, such as the previously mentioned pressure from the federal
government, likely have been more directly responsible. It may well be,
however, that North Dakota's strong Norwegian connections contribute
to more ready acceptance of frequent public and political calls for
increased penalties. Many North Dakotans may know something about
Norway's previous long-standing practice of minimum, unsuspended
twenty-one-day jail sentences for first offense drinking and driving, or, if
they do not know the details, they may at least know that Norway's
punishment for DUI is severe. Newspapers and politicians are the
primary educators in this respect, and it is also fair to assume that if
ordinary North Dakotans know anything about the law of Norway-the
ancestral home of many-the fact that Norway has strict punishment
provisions is likely all they know. However, an investigation of Norwe-
gian law and practice has disclosed a surprising variety of significant
differences in addition to sentencing law and practice. In this time of
change in Norway and continued concern in North Dakota, it might
prove interesting, and perhaps useful, to point out the main differences
discovered. My goal is not to evaluate critically and recommend
particular aspects as superior or suitable candidates for "transplan-
tation," 8 but rather simply to describe some significant differences. 9
I. NATURE OF THE CRIME
A. "PROMILLE" AND "PER SE" OFFENSES; UNDER THE INFLUENCE
In 1936, Norway became the first country to redefine the crime of
"drunk driving" from driving under the influence of alcohol to driving
with a prohibited amount of alcohol in the blood (blood alcohol concen-
education. See GRAND FORKS HERALD, Nov. 24, 1999. In 1994, North Dakota received a D from
MADD; however, then-chair of the Governor's Committee on DUI and Traffic Safety and now
district judge James Vukelic declared that "North Dakota is generally ahead of the game in terms of
working with new ideas .... We've adopted most of the programs that have worked successfully in
other states." GRAND FORKS HERALD, Jan. 1, 1994, at 6B. Vukelic also stated that "[tihe MADD survey
serves a valuable service. It prods us to do better, but the very, very bottom line in DUI and traffic
safety is the number of lives lost on our highways due to drivers who are impaired .... If you look at
that measure, then North Dakota really has something to brag about." Id. A member of the Minot,
North Dakota Mayor's Committee on Traffic Safety, said that while North Dakota deserved better
than a D grade on MADD's survey, a lot of work needed to be done for an A. Id. "It is an on-going
educational process, and we just have to change our information and tactics .... We are open to
anything that looks like it works anywhere else." Id.
8. For the classic discussion of "legal transplants" in comparative law, see A. WATSON, LEGAL
TRANsPLANrs: AN APPROAcH To COMPARATvE LAW (1974). A masterful discussion of French criminal
procedure and, to a lesser extent, criminal law, in the context of possible "transplantation" or
"borrowings" in United States law is found in a 1990 law review article by Richard S. Frase. See
generally Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How
Do the French Do it, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care? 78 CALIF. L. REV. 539 (1990).
9. For more regarding the modest purpose of this article, see discussion infra Part V.
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tration, or "BAC").10 In Norway, the offense is labeled both popularly
and in the legal literature as "promillekjoring," short for "driving with
an alcohol concentration in the blood of over 0.5 per thousand." 11
North Dakota, like Norway, has adopted a per se prohibition, but
North Dakota's adoption in 1983 was relatively recent. 12 Not only is
North Dakota's per se prohibition a newcomer in comparison to Nor-
way's per se law, it is also significantly weaker, for it allows twice as
much blood alcohol before the driver reaches the per se limit of .10%. 13
Both Norway and North Dakota are considering reduction in the per se
BAC. The North Dakota Legislature, at its 1999 session, was again pre-
sented with a proposition to lower the per se level from .10% to .08%.
Most states currently use .10%, but a minority of them, which the North
Dakota legislature is repeatedly asked to join, use reduced per se levels.
Citing the alternative, under the influence charge, available under North
Dakota's DUI law, representatives again defeated the measure in a 68-29
vote. 14
10. JOHs ANDENs & ANDERS BRATHOLm, SPESIELL STRAFFERETr [SPECAL CRIMINAL LAw] 325 (3d
ed. 1996).
11. The Norwegian statute goes dn to include "or an amount of alcohol in the body which can
lead to that level of alcohol." Vegtrafikkloven [The Road Traffic Act] § 22.1.
12. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(1) (1997 & Supp. 1999); see also BRUCE D. QuicK, I ONLY HAD
Two BEERS, at ii, 6 (1992) (describing adoption of the per se law in 1983 and subsequent amendments
to the law).
13. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(l)(a) (1997 & Supp. 1999). In their "Note on Terminology,"
the editors of Social Control, supra note 1, at xvii, xviii, observe that:
Although the current differences of opinion about general terminology cannot be
easily resolved [referring to their description of different terms used to describe the
general subject and problems with each term: drunken driving, drunk driving, drinking-
driving behavior, DUI (driving under the influence), DWI (driving while intoxicated),
alcohol-impaired driving], the situation is quite different in the narrow, technical domain
pertaining to blood alcohol concentration (called BAC in the United States). Despite the
apparent international diversity of measures for BAC, all can be "translated" into equiva-
lent scientific scales. Thus, if an American driver is recorded as having .08 percent
BAC, this means the blood sample showed .08 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of
blood. However, the scale in Canada and the United Kingdom is based upon milligrams
of alcohol in 100 milliliters of blood. In still another variation of decimal displacement,
the Scandinavian countries favor a scale based on 100 milligrams per 100 liters of blood
so that a value of 80 milligrams per 100 liters would be reported as .8 per mille.
Editor's Introduction, in SOCIAL CONTOL, supra note 1, at xvii, xviii. Alan C. Donelson further
explains:
Concentrations of alcohol in body fluids and breath can be expressed in various units of
measurement. In this paper, two conventional BAC unites have been used: (1) milligram
percent (mg%), which specifies milligrams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or other
fluid; and (2) percent weight-volume (% w/v), which specifies milligrams of alcohol per
.1 milliliter of body fluid. These units correspond as follows: 50 mg% = .05% (w/v), 100
mg% = .10%, 150mg% = .15% (w/v), etc.
ALAN C. DONALDSON, SOCIAL CONTROL 385 (Michael D. Laurence et al eds., 1988).
Therefore, under the Scandinavian measurement system, .05% would be indicated as .5 per mille.
Throughout this article, unless otherwise indicated, the Scandinavian measurements will be converted
to the United States weight/volume measurement.
14. Dale Wetzel, House Defeats Proposal to Lower DUI Blood-Alcohol Level, BISMARCK TRIBUNE,
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In Norway, the government is proposing to lower the per se limit for
DUI from .05% to .02% and punish the lowest levels, .02% to .05%, with
fines. 15 The proposal is not without serious opposition, but the mantra
"drinking and driving don't belong together" appears likely to carry
the proposition despite doubts regarding its cost-benefit ratio.
Another difference between the "per se" definitions is that in
Norway, the statute prohibits driving with a quantity of alcohol in the
body that leads to a BAC above .05%.16 Because of the absorption curve
of alcohol in the body, it is possible that a driver may have less than
.05% measurable in the blood at the time of driving, but more than .05%
later, such as at the time of the BAC test. In North Dakota, the law allows
a per se conviction if the driver has greater than a .10% BAC and the test
is taken any time within two hours of driving. 17
Despite adoption of per se regulations, both Norway and North
Dakota retain the original, now alternative, offense of "driving while
under the influence." 18 In North Dakota, a person can be convicted of
that offense, and can be penalized the same as for the per se violation,
with evidence of a blood alcohol content of less than .10%, although this
seldom happens in practice.19 A person may similarly be convicted and
Jan. 21, 1999. See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
15. ODIN Samferdselsdepartementet (SD) (visited Apr. 6, 2000) <http://odin.dep.no/html/
nofovaltloffpub/repub/99-00/otprp26/index.htm> (describing in a government publication the proposal
and responses from concerned interest groups in Norway to whom it was circulated for comment).
See also generally SVEIN SITrAN & TORIL MARIE 0 IE, FORBRYTELSE OG STRAFF [CRIME & PUNISHMENT]
497 (1997).
16. Vegtrafikkloven [The Road Traffic Act] § 22.1. When Norway originally adopted the
"promille" limit, the alcohol concentration in the blood while driving was determinative. That created
proof problems in cases where drivers drank shortly before driving and claimed that the BAC at the
time of testing was not representative of the lower amount that could have reached the blood at the
time of driving. In 1959, the law was amended to avoid this evidentiary problem by specifying that it is
the quantity of alcohol in the body (not only the blood) at the time of driving that is decisive because it
leads to a later prohibited BAC. See MAGNUS MATNINGSDAL, PROMILLEKJORING OG ETTERFLGENDE
ALKOHOLNYTELSE [DRUNK DRIVING AND SUBSEQUENT USE OF ALCOHOL] 18 (1981); Ragnar Hauge,
Drinking and Driving in Scandinavia, Norway, 6 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN CRIMINOLOGY 19, 24 (1978).
17. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(1)(a) (1997 & Supp. 1999).
18. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(1)(b) (1997 & Supp. 1999); Vegtrafikkloven [ The Road Traffic
Act] § 22.1. The Norwegian prohibition makes it clear that the per se offense is in effect a
presumption of alcohol influence. Vegtrafikkloven [The Road Traffic Act] § 22.1. It reads:
No one may drive or attempt to drive a motor vehicle when influenced by alcohol. One
having a greater alcohol concentration in the blood than 0.5 per thousand or an alcohol
concentration in the body which can lead to that quantity of alcohol in the blood, or a
greater alcohol concentration in the breath than 0.25 milligrams per liter of air, is
considered in all cases as affected by alcohol (not sober) with respect to the provisions
of this statute. Mistake with respect to the size of the alcohol concentration does not
provide a defense.
Id.
19. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07(2) (1999); State v. Engebretson, 326 N.W.2d 212 (N.D. 1982).
Section 39-20-07 of the North Dakota Century Code prescribes the presumptions and evidentiary
weight of chemical tests. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07 (1999). The statute provides: "A person
having, at that time, an alcohol concentration of not more than five one-hundredths of one percent by
weight is presumed not to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor." N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-
07(1) (1999). The statute further provides that more than five one-hundredths of one percent alcohol
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penalized in Norway for a blood alcohol concentration of .05% or lower
or, in the absence of any "scientific" evidence or measurement, upon
extremely good evidence of intoxication at the time of driving, such as
testimony from the police officer about the defendant's driving and
condition. 20
B. COMPLICITY
Norwegian criminal law has no general complicity provisions. 21
However, some criminal prohibitions specifically include complicity,
thereby broadening the scope of the offense to include those who assist a
person violating its explicit prohibition. Norway's DUI provision does
not include a complicity provision as such; therefore, only actual drivers
are covered, and one who loans a car to a drunk driver or convinces a
drunk to drive him or her home can't be punished for DUI as an
accomplice. 22
In North Dakota, the practice seems similar, since the author is not
aware of any attempts to prosecute for aiding and abetting a DUL. This
is somewhat surprising in light of the political and social pushes to "get
tough" on drinking and driving. In light of the general provision
governing complicity in North Dakota's criminal code, however, it
would appear that proof, for example, that a drinking companion, aware
of the driver's obvious intoxication, urged the driver to drive the com-
panion's car, would satisfy both the conduct and culpability require-
ments for complicity. 2 3
C. ATTEMPTS TO DRIVE
In Norway, as in North Dakota, drunk driving is typically a
misdemeanor. 24 According to the Norwegian criminal code, attempted
concentration by weight is relevant evidence, but such evidence does not receive the prima facie
effect in determining if the person was under the influence. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07(2). Finally,
a person having an alcohol concentration of at least ten one-hundredths of one percent, or two
one-hundredths of one percent if the person is under 21, when subjected to a chemical test within two
hours of driving, "is under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of driving or being in
physical control of the vehicle." N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07(3) (1999).
20. See State v. Skipton, 339 N.W.2d 87, 88-89 (N.D. 1983) (holding a chemical test is not re-
quired to support a conviction for DUI when other evidence is sufficient to establish the elements of
the offense); see also Vegtrafikkloven [The Road Traffic Act] § 22.1; Magnus Matningsdal, Alkohol-
pdvirkning av Motorvognforer [Influence of Alcohol on Motor Vehicle Drivers], in VEGTRAFKLovEN
OG TRAFIKKREGLENE MED KOMMENTARER [THE ROAD TRAFFIC A CT AND THE TRAFFiC RULES wITH CoM-
MENTARY] 281 (3d ed. 1998).
21. SLErrAN & OE, supra note 15, at 123.
22. SLMrAN & 0IE, supra note 15, at 491.
23. Section 12.1-03-01(1)(b) of the North Dakota Century Code provides that a person may be
convicted for another's conduct commanded, induced, procured, or aided with intent that an offense
be committed. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-03-01(I)(b) (1999).
24. Vegtrafikkloven [The Road Traffic Act] § 31.1; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(2)
(1999). A first or second offense within five years is a class B misdemeanor. See N.D. CENT. CODE §
39-08-01(2). A third offense within five years, or a fourth offense within seven years, is a class A
[VOL. 76:33
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misdemeanors are not punishable unless the statute creating the offense
specifically prohibits attempt. 25 The Norwegian DUI statute does so by
including anyone who "drives or attempts to drive." 26 North Dakota
has no similar "attempt" language in its traffic code, although attempt is
prohibited by the criminal code and is not limited to serious offenses. 27
The North Dakota traffic law does prohibit being "in actual physical
control" ("APC") of a motor vehicle while under the influence. 28
North Dakota's APC provision is thus analogous to Norway's attempt
provision, but it is probably more inclusive because it is applied to
punish drivers who might drive, irrespective of any evidence of an actual
attempt to drive.29 Perhaps because of that inclusiveness, the author has
never read or heard of a prosecution in North Dakota for "attempted"
DUI.30
The difference between North Dakota's APC provision and Nor-
way's attempt provision is best illustrated by considering a person who
turns on the car engine to get warm but has no intention of driving. The
North Dakotan is guilty of APC,31 whereas the Norwegian would not be
guilty of an attempt because of the absence of intent to drive. The
"attempt" prohibited in the Norwegian statute is punished with the same
severity as actual driving, contrary to the ordinarily less severe punish-
ment for other attempts provided in the Norwegian criminal code. 32 The
punishment provided for North Dakota's APC provision is substantially
the same as for DUL; the main distinction is that mandatory jail sentences
for repeat offenses may be suspended or replaced by appropriate
misdemeanor. Id. A fifth or subsequent offense within seven years is a class C felony. Id
25. ANDENES & BRATHOLM, supra note 10, at 329-30 (explaining Straffeloven [The Criminal
Code] § 49).
26. Vegtrafikkloven [The Road Traffic Act] § 22.1 (emphasis added).
27. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-02 (1999).
28. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(1) (1997 & Supp. 1999).
29. See, e.g., Buck v. North Dakota Highway Comm'r, 425 N.W.2d 370 (N.D. 1988). Buck
describes the purpose of the APC statute as prevention. Id. at 372. Despite the fact that Buck argued
he was merely trying to "sleep it off," the court stated an intoxicated person behind the steering wheel
of a vehicle is a threat because "he might set out on an inebriated journey at any moment." Id. at 373
(citing Martin v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 358 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)). The
court further stated, "The real purpose of the statute is to deter individuals who have been drinking
intoxicating liquor from getting into their vehicles, except as passengers." Id. (citing State v. Ghylin,
250 N.W.2d 252, 255 (N.D. 1977)). The court continued, "An intoxicated individual who gets into his
vehicle to sleep poses a threat of immediate operation of the vehicle at any time while still
intoxicated." Id. at 373. Thus, in North Dakota, judicial interpretation of the APC offense weighs the
danger of the sleeper's possible waking and driving as heavier than the presumed incentive to "sleep it
off' rather than drive.
30. It is certainly conceivable, however, that someone stopped before getting into a car could be
charged with attempted DUI. North Dakota thus has extremely broad deterrent coverage, especially
in light of the fact that both APC and attempted DUI are "strict liability" crimes in North Dakota. See
State v. Novotny, 562 N.W.2d 95 (ND. 1997).
31. See, e.g., City of Valley City v. Berg, 394 N.W.2d 690 (N.D. 1986).
32. SLETTAN & Ore, supra note 15, at 491-92 (suggesting that an attempt may nevertheless be
treated as a sentencing factor, presumably in mitigation).
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community service. 33 That distinction may play a role in the plea
bargaining process described under Part III. B below.
D. SUBSEQUENT USE OF ALCOHOL [ETTERFOLGENDE
ALKOHOLNYTELSE] AND OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
Norway prohibits drinking any quantity of alcohol within six hours
after driving by anyone who has good reason to believe there will be a
police investigation. 34 This prohibition is unique, even among other strict
Nordic countries. 35 The Norwegian prohibition is intended to prevent a
drinking driver who is found after driving from escaping punishment
by claiming that the drinking took place after the driving.36 The punish-
ment for subsequent use of alcohol is potentially the same as for DUI,
although in practice it is easier to get a suspended jail sentence or fine. 37
In North Dakota, the problem of drinking after driving is handled as a
matter of evidence and credibility. If the fact finder is convinced that
the defendant drank only after driving, no conviction results. 38
A defendant believed to have drunk both before (or during) and
after driving may presumably not be convicted under the per se law,
even if the statute might literally apply. In City of Bismarck v. Preston,
the defendant claimed that he drank alcohol during the time that elapsed
between his driving and his return to the scene of a traffic accident. 39
The trial court refused to use a subsequent alcohol test as "conclusive
evidence" of the per se offense. 40 However, the court considered the test
result as circumstantial evidence of the older, now alternative, driving
33. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(4)(e)(1) (1997 & Supp. 1999). North Dakota courts have
struggled to distinguish the offenses of DUI and APC. In State v. Huber, the court characterized APC
as a different offense from DUI due to the difference in penalties. State v. Huber, 555 N.W.2d 791,
795 (N.D. 1996). The Huber court discussed the legislative history of the APC and DUI provisions
and concluded that under prior law APC was not a lesser-included offense because prior to 1983 the
penalties for DUI and APC were the same. Id. Subsequent to the 1983 legislative amendments that
allow suspension of sentence for only APC, the court stated that the penalties were now different,
making APC a lesser-included offense of DUI. Id. at 796.
34. Vegtrafikkloven [The Road Traffic Act] § 22.2.
35. SLETFAN & OIE, supra note 15, at 488; see also ANDENrS & BRATHOLM, supra note 10, at
349.
36. SLEfrAN & OrE, supra note 15, at 489.
37. ANDENES & BRATHoLM, supra note 10, at 348.
38. See, e.g., State v. Kaloustain, 212 N.W.2d 843 (N.D. 1973) (concluding that where the defen-
dant was found at least one and one-half hours after a one-car accident and was intoxicated when
found, the lack of evidence of intoxication at time of driving meant the evidence was insufficient to
support conviction).
39. City of Bismarck v. Preston, 374 N.W.2d 602, 603 (N.D. 1985). The defendant attempted to
show that the intervening time period was "substantial," but the court rejected this, observing that after
he was seen driving erratically and backing into a car at about 8:00 p.m., he left the scene before
returning and being arrested 11 minutes later. Id.
40. Id.
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under the influence offense. 41 The court's emphasis on the fair admin-
istration of the test and the "minimal" amount of time between the
accident and the BAC test suggest that test evidence will not, under all
circumstances, be admissible in under the influence cases. 42 Prosecutors
will, in cases of doubt, charge the alternative, under the influence offense
instead of the per se offense. 43
In theory, it might also be possible to charge a defendant who
manages to drink between driving and apprehension with obstruction of
justice or destruction or alteration of evidence offenses, but I have never
seen or heard of that being done. The problems of proof, especially
with respect to the defendant's intention, would present great difficulties
for the prosecution. 44
E. DUI IN ANOTHER STATE OR COUNTRY
Another significant difference between North Dakotan and Norwe-
gian DUI law is the possibility of being convicted for DUI for an offense
committed in another jurisdiction. A Norwegian may be convicted in
41. Id.. Although the court found the evidence relevant, it suggested consumption of alcohol in
the intervening time between driving and the chemical test would likely be inapplicable in a per se
offense prosecution by stating "because of the lower court's limited use of the evidence ... the
evidence cannot be considered prejudicial." Id.
42. Id. at 604. In Preston, the defendant was charged under Bismarck municipal ordinance 35-
148(a)(2), which at the time was identical to section 39-08-01(l)(b) of the North Dakota Century
Code. Id. at 603.
43. Due to the defendant's intervening time argument in Preston, the lower court refused to
employ a chemical test as "conclusive evidence" of a per se violation; however, the lower court found
the chemical test to be appropriate "circumstantial evidence" of a violation of the alternative "under
the influence" offense. Id. Section 39-08-01(l)(a) of the North Dakota Century Code indicates that,
for the per se presumption to be used, a chemical test must be conducted within two hours of driving.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(1)(a) (1997 & Supp. 1999). On the other hand, section 39-08-01(1)(b)-
(d) of the North Dakota Century Code allows for prosecution irrespective of the time of the test. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(l)(b)-(d) (1997 & Supp. 1999).
44. Section 12.1-08-01 of the North Dakota Century Code, entitled "Physical Obstruction of a
Government Function," is likely inapplicable as subsection 2 of the provision explicitly states the
statute does not apply to the conduct of a person obstructing arrest of himself. N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-08-01 (1999). Second, section 12.1-08-02 of the North Dakota Century Code, entitled "Pre-
venting Arrest or Discharge of Other Duties," requires the offender to create a substantial risk of
bodily injury to a public servant or anyone but himself before the statute is applicable. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-08-02 (1999). Third, section 12.1-08-03 of the North Dakota Century Code, entitled "Hin-
dering Law Enforcement," requires an actor to harbor, conceal, or provide a means to avoid
apprehension, concealment of a document or thing, warning another of impending discovery, or
providing false information to law enforcement for the offense to be applicable. N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-08-03 (1999). Finally, section 12.1-09-03 of the North Dakota Century Code, entitled "Tamper-
ing with Physical Evidence," requires an actor to alter, destroy, mutilate, conceal, or remove a
document or thing in order for the offense to be applicable. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-09-03 (1999).
None of these provisions seems clearly to apply to an offender who consumes alcohol after driving in
an effort to alter the effects of chemical testing, and, since North Dakota follows the rule of strict
construction of criminal statutes, they are likely inapplicable to such situations. See State v.
Plentychief, 464 N.W.2d 373, 375 (N.D. 1990).
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Norway for DUI committed in another country.45 A North Dakotan
may only be convicted in North Dakota courts for a DUI committed
within North Dakota.46 However, a compact, analogous to a treaty,
between the majority of states allows North Dakota officials to sanction
administratively a person with a North Dakota driver's license for
offenses reported from another compact member state. 47 Thus, North
Dakotans can be sanctioned administratively for DUIs committed in
other states, though not criminally.
II. APPREHENSION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
A. RANDOM STOPS AND ROADBLOCKS
In both Norway and North Dakota, police may stop a driver to
investigate driving conduct that leads them to a reasonable suspicion that
the driver may be under the influence of alcohol.48 Moreover, stops
made for other reasons, for example speeding, may frequently lead to
suspicion of drinking and further investigation of possible DUI.4 9
Norway, however, makes regular use of roadblocks or random stops,
which are not based upon any suspicion of the individual stopped.50
45. Straffeloven [The Criminal Code] § 12; Vegtrafikkloven [The Road Traffic Act] § 22.1. The
liability for conduct outside of Norway only applies to citizens and residents of Norway, and it
requires also that the driving be criminalized in the other country as well. ANDENES & BRATHIou,
supra note 10, at 349. The subsequent use of alcohol prohibition, described infra, because it is unique
to Norway, is not punishable when committed outside of Norway. ANDEmas & BRATHOLm, supra note
10, at 349.
46. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-03-01.1 (1997) (identifying when persons are liable to be prosecuted
in North Dakota). The statute explicitly indicates the offenses for which one may be prosecuted in
North Dakota when the offense conduct did not occur there. Id. DUI is not one of the enumerated
offenses. Id.
47. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-19-01 (1999) (giving the Director of the Department of Transportation
the power to execute agreements involving reciprocity between North Dakota and any other state on
matters relating to drivers' licensing, financial responsibility, and traffic law enforcement). For a
further discussion of administrative sanctions see, infra, section IV.F.
48. See, e.g., State v. Burris, 545 N.W.2d 192, 194 (N.D. 1996) (holding that a vehicle that twice
crossed the fog line was subject to being stopped); Moran v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 543
N.W.2d 767, 770 (N.D. 1996) (holding that a vehicle crossing the centerline and "jerking and
weaving" within its own lane offered sufficient justification to stop the motorist); State v. Hawley, 540
N.W.2d 390 (N.D. 1995) (holding suspicion of a parking violation warranted investigation); State v.
Ova, 539 N.W.2d 857 (N.D. 1995) (holding suspicion of potential violation of exhibition or careless
driving statutes justified stopping a motorist); State v. Placek, 386 N.W.2d 36, 37 (N.D. 1986) (holding
reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist exists when a vehicle's taillights appear inoperable); State v.
Dorendorf, 359 N.W.2d 115, 117 (N.D. 1984) (holding a car weaving within its own lane of traffic is
a sufficient reason to stop for investigation); State v. Kolb, 239 N.W.2d 815, 819 (N.D. 1976) (holding
changes in speed and weaving within a lane are sufficient justifications for a stop); see also Thomas
M. Lockney, Justice Beryl Levine: Taking Her Title Seriously in North Dakota Criminal Cases, 72 N.D.
L. REV. 967, 979 (1996) (criticizing the North Dakota reasonable suspicion traffic stop doctrine and
the Ova case).
49. See generally State v. Mertz, 362 N.W.2d 410 (N.D. 1985).
50. Vegtrafikkloven [The Road Traffic Act] § 10.
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In the United States, the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution
forbids "unreasonable searches and seizures" and generally requires
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify a stop, which is consid-
ered a seizure, even though temporary. In Michigan Department of
State Police v. Sitz,51 the United States Supreme Court determined that
roadblocks are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, at least when
conducted as in Sitz.52 Subsequently, some state supreme courts have
found roadblocks to be impermissible on state constitutional grounds. 53
Results of constitutional challenges in state courts have been mixed, with
some courts approving the police conduct, some conditioning approval
upon compliance with specific guidelines, and others holding roadblocks
to be unconstitutional. 54 Prior to Sitz, the North Dakota Supreme Court
had not ruled on the permissibility of sobriety checkpoints. 55
In the aftermath of Sitz, the North Dakota Supreme Court was faced
with a similar case in City of Bismarck v. Uhden.56 In Uhden, the city of
Bismarck established a sobriety checkpoint, at which police stopped
Uhden. 57 The court affirmed Uhden's subsequent conviction, holding
the checkpoint violated neither the Fourth Amendment nor the North
Dakota Constitution. 58 The court held the checkpoint in question valid
in light of the city's interest in controlling drunk driving, carefully
tailored guidelines, operational briefings, lack of discretion by the
officers in determining which vehicles would be stopped, and use of
safety precautions.59
51. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
52. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
53. See generally Sitz v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. 1993). Interest-
ingly, the Michigan Supreme Court, on remand from the United States Supreme Court, determined that
sobriety checkpoints were unconstitutional on state constitutional grounds. Id. Similarly, North
Dakota's neighboring state, Minnesota, does not permit sobriety checkpoints under the Minnesota
constitution. See Ascher v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. 1994).
54. MARC L. MILER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 93 (1998) (counting "nearly" 40
states as following Sitz and a "substantial minority (about 10)" as requiring individualized suspicion).
For a thorough discussion of sobriety checkpoints under the Fourth Amendment and a critique of Sitz,
see 4 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.8(d) (1996).
55. In one interesting related case, however, the North Dakota Supreme Court refused to ap-
prove a stop by a state highway patrol officer as a routine "safety check" stop when the government
produced testimony by the officer that he had followed standard procedures but failed to introduce
any evidence of what the standard procedures consisted. See State v. Goehring, 374 N.W.2d 882
(N.D. 1985).
56. 513 N.W.2d 373 (N.D. 1994).
57. City of Bismarck v. Uhden, 513 N.W.2d 373, 374 (N.D. 1994).
58. Id. at 378.
59. Id. at 378-79. 1 have previously suggested the Uhden opinion is mere dictum, because the
court rejected defendant's reliance on a state statute he claimed did not authorize a reasonable
suspicion stop, when in fact the stop in Uhden was made on no suspicion whatsoever. See Lockney,
supra note 48, at 975-79.
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The impact and effectiveness of combating impaired drivers
through the use of sobriety checkpoints is contentious and debatable in
the United States generally and North Dakota specifically. Those
advocating checkpoint operations concede that, because of the brevity of
the contact, not all impaired drivers who are stopped are arrested.
However, others suggest a deterrent effect which, although difficult to
measure, seems plausible because the public has a heightened awareness
when sobriety checkpoints are used. The arguments for and against
checkpoints are aired in the Sitz opinions and in extensive legal com-
mentary in the United States.60 The main point here is that despite Sitz
and Uhden, the controversy continues, and anecdotal evidence suggests
that sobriety checkpoints are not yet common in North Dakota. In
Norway, contrarily, they are both common and uncontroversial.
B. BREATH AND BLOOD ALCOHOL TESTS
In both Norway and North Dakota, a portable breath-testing device
is, or may be, used by the police in the field to determine whether the
defendant shall be further processed as a suspected drunk driver.61 In
Norway, a positive reading on the breath "alkotest" leads to a clinical
examination, blood test by medical personnel, or a more sophisticated
police administered breath test.62 In North Dakota, similar field breath
testing devices including the A.L.E.R.T., SD2, and Alco-Sensor may be
used for an arrest determination. 63
However, police proficiency levels and availability of these devices
may be limited by the fact that, unlike Norway, North Dakota has three
levels of police jurisdiction, with some overlap in authority. The state
Highway Patrol is limited primarily to traffic enforcement on highways;
county sheriffs are responsible for general law enforcement throughout
counties but typically outside the cities and towns; and municipal police
are responsible for enforcement in cities and towns. 64 It may be surpris-
ing for Norwegians to learn that a town with a population as small as
60. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 54.
61. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-14 (1999); Vegtrafikkloven [The Road Traffic Act] § 22a.1.
62. Vegtrafikkloven [The Road Traffic Act) § 22a; ANDENES & BRATHOLM, supra note 10, at 350.
63. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-14 (allowing the use of a screening test only for determining
whether a further test shall be given).
64. Jurisdiction for municipal police agencies is within the municipality and one-and-one-half
miles outside the city limits. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-20-05(1) (1999). Sheriffs and deputies have
jurisdiction within their respective counties, including cities and towns within the county, and up to
one-and-one-half miles into adjacent counties. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-01-01 (1999). State patrol
officers have jurisdiction on all highways and on all state-owned property. N.D. CENT. CODE §
39-03-03(11)-(12) (1999). Interestingly, the statutory definition of highways includes roadways within
cities and towns; thus, highway patrol officers have jurisdiction on virtually all roadways within the
state. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-01-01(24) (1999).
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1,500 may have its own police department consisting of one or two
police officers.65
In contrast, Norway has uniform training and centralized control of
its police. The police are under administrative hierarchy of the Ministry
of Justice; indeed, it is officially the "Royal Norwegian Ministry of
Justice and the Police." Also of interest and relevant to many points of
this comparison, every police department is headed by a police chief
required to be a law school graduate. Each department has subordinate
officers who are also lawyers and who direct investigations and handle
lower level prosecution functions. 66
North Dakota law authorizes trained and certified police officers to
administer screening tests if the driver has committed a moving traffic
violation or was involved in an accident and the officer has formulated
an opinion that the driver's body contains alcohol. 67 The screening
devices are used only in the officer's ascertainment of probable cause to
arrest for DUI and a determination to administer chemical testing
following arrest. 68 Refusal to submit to an on-site screening test will
result in the revocation of driving privileges for up to three years unless
the driver "cures" the refusal by submission to subsequent testing for
the same offense. 69
In Norway, after a driver is determined likely to be under the
influence in the field, evidence for subsequent prosecution is obtained
either by a physician's clinical examination, a blood test, or a more
sophisticated breath test. The breath test is administered by the police;
despite the convenience of the breath test for both the police and the sus-
pect (assuming a favorable result), its use is fairly recent in Norway.
Opposition to breath testing was lead by the head of the State Forensic
Toxicology Institute, who disputed the reliability of breath testing for
65. Notwithstanding these jurisdictional differences, often an officer with broader jurisdictional
authority can "vest" the officer possessing less jurisdictional enforcement authority with the authority
to stop and arrest potential violators. For example, in State v. Graven, a highway patrolman vested a
Casselton, North Dakota police officer with authority to stop a suspected drunk driver after the officer
radioed the patrolman with his observations. State v. Graven, 530 N.W.2d 328 (N.D. 1995).
Likewise, in Mead v. North Dakota Department of Transportation, a sheriff's deputy directed a city
police officer to stop and subsequently arrest a DUI offender outside the city police officer's
jurisdiction. Mead v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 581 N.W.2d 145 (N.D. Ct. App. 145 1998).
66. See Johs. Andenas, Criminal Law, Criminology, and Criminal Procedure in Knoph 's Over-
view of Norwegian Law (Thomas Lockney trans.) (10th ed. 1993), 2 J. INT'L L & PRACTICE 431, 458
-(1993).
67. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-14 (1999). Three devices are currently approved for use by the
state toxicologist. See id. These devices are the A.L.E.R.T., the Alco-sensor, and the SD2. Each
device is portable, but only the SD2 gives a "quantifiable" reading. The SD2 lists an approximation of
the driver's alcohol content, whereas the A.L.E.R.T. and Alco-sensor only indicate a pass, warn, or
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evidentiary purposes. Blood samples are taken by doctors, officially
authorized nurses, or medical technologists and sent for analysis to the
State Forensic Toxicology Institute. 70
In North Dakota, a state statute allows the arresting police officer to
determine whether the defendant will be taken to a medical facility for a
blood, urine, or saliva test, or to a police station where a breath test will
be taken on an "Intoxilyzer." 71 The Intoxilyzer is a device approved
by the state toxicologist for infrared spectrographic analysis of the
alcohol content in the subject's breath.72 The machine is largely com-
puter driven, and thus police officers with no scientific training them-
selves are taught and authorized by the toxicologist to run tests on
drivers. 73 The Intoxilyzer converts the measurement of breath alcohol to
blood alcohol on the basis of a formula thought by the state toxicologist
and some, but by no means all, other experts to be a fair approximation
of the ratio between breath and blood alcohol content.74
Finally, in Norway, the blood sample can be taken by force, and, if
the suspect refuses to co-operate, driving privileges are revoked for at
least two years.75 In North Dakota, the defendant may generally refuse
70. Vegtrafikkloven [The Road TrafficAct] § 22a; ANDENS & BRATHOLmo, supra note 10, at 350
(suggesting that the "new type" of test was approved by the Justice Department in 1996 and as of that
date the "very advanced and costly" test apparatus was available in few police stations); see also R.N.
Torgersen, in VEGTRArKKLOVEN OG T RAFKKREGLENE MED KOMMErARER [THE RoaD4 TRAFFIC AcT AND
THE TRAFFIC R ut.s wrrH COMMENTARY] (R.N. Torgersen & Bjom Engstrom eds., 3d ed. 1998) (describ-
ing the new apparatus as the "Intoxilyzer 5000 N" developed in the United States and adapted for
Norwegian use).
71. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (1999).
72. Id. Officers administering chemical Intoxilyzer tests are trained and certified by the State
Toxicologist and must administer the test in accordance with the approved method of the State
Toxicologist's office. The approved method provides that a subject will provide two breath samples;
the lower of the two tests, if the test is valid, becomes the reported alcohol content. See generally
N.D. CETr. CODE § 39-20-07 (1999) (providing statutory authority for the State Toxicologist and
detailing chemical test interpretation).
73. The State Toxicologist's office conducts a 40-hour training session to certify operators in the
use of the Intoxilyzer. Additionally, officers must periodically re-certify in the use of the instrument.
See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07(6) (1999) (providing statutory authority for training and
certification of chemical test operators).
74. See BRUCE D. QUICK, I ONLY HAD 2 B EERS: A NORTH DAKOTA PROSECUTOR'S M ANUAL OR
DUI CASES 45-55 (1992) (discussing the operation of the Intoxilyzer 5000). Significant controversy
exists regarding the use of instruments such as the Intoxilyzer, particularly the conversion ratio
commonly referred to as "Henry's Law." A detailed annotation discusses Henry's Law at length, as
well as individual state interpretation of chemical testing. See David Polin, Annotation, Challenges to
Use of Breath Tests for Drunk Drivers Based on Claim That Partition or Conversion Ration Between
Measured Breath Alcohol and Actual Blood Alcohol is Inaccurate, 90 A.L.R.4th 155 (1991); see also
State v. McCarty, 434 N.W.2d 67, 68 (S.D. 1988) (indicating a standard ratio of 2100:1 was used,
while actual ratios may vary from 1142:1 to 3478:1).
75. Vegtrafikkloven [The Road Traffic Act] § 33.
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both a blood or breath test, but the refusal leads to revocation of driving
privileges for up to three years. 76
III. LAWYERS, JUDGES, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS
A. TRIALS AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
It is my impression that the processing of a DUI case in Norway is
generally fairly cut and dried and is therefore a relatively simple affair.77
I have not yet discovered any detail about how the actual prosecution of
a Norwegian DUI compares with other misdemeanors, but I recall a
"dommerfullmektig" (deputy judge) friend telling me that he had "lots
of drunk driving cases" in his court. When I asked him if I could watch
a trial, he replied, "Oh, we never have trials. There's nothing to try."
Most cases are determined by a single judge sitting as a magistrate
("court of summary jurisdiction") and accepting a defendant's plea of
guilty .78
In North Dakota, DUI is typically a misdemeanor. 79 All misde-
meanor defendants are entitled to demand a jury trial with six jurors,
which DUI defendants often do.80 Although a great majority of cases
are disposed of by pleas of guilty, it is likely that more DUI cases go to
trial than any other category of misdemeanor. 81 At trial, defendants
vigorously urge relatively strict and formal rules of evidence in an
attempt to have various types of evidence excluded from consideration
by the jury or ignored by the judge if a jury trial is waived.
76. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-04(1) (1997). The period of revocation may be increased up to
three years depending on the number of previous suspensions or revocations within the preceding five
years. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-04(1)(c) (1997). The driver also may not be able to refuse a
blood test if involved in a motor vehicle accident causing death or serious bodily injury. See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 39-20-01.1 (1997). The statute provides that a driver involved in such an accident may
be compelled to submit to an alcohol test by a police officer with probable cause to believe the driver
is in violation of the DUI provisions. Id.
77. It is beyond the scope of this article to describe the difference between the so-called
continental or "inquisitorial" trial system and the "adversarial" system used in the United States. For a
useful and entertaining comparison of the "European" approach and that of the United States in the
context of the trial of O.J. Simpson, see Myron Moskowitz, The O.J. Inquisition: A United States
Encounter With Continental Criminal Justice, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1121 (1995). In general,
Norway seems to be somewhere between the continental system and the adversarial system. See
generally ANDEN s, supra note 66.
78. Straffeprossessloven [Code of Criminal Procedure] § 248. Magnus Matningsdal, Nyere
Reaksjonspraksis m.v. ved Promillekjoring og Etterfolgende Alkoholnytelse [Recent Sanction Practice
Regarding Drunk Driving and Subsequent Use of Alcohol], 1993 Lov oo RETT [LAW AND JUs7tcE] 151,
179.
79. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(2) (1999).
80. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-17-12 (1997).
81. See QUICK, supra note 74, at ii ("[L]ikely no other crime in modem times, misdemeanor or
felony.... is so frequently contested").
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One of the most commonly used strategies to exclude evidence is
the constitutional exclusionary rule, created by the United States
Supreme Court, which declares that any evidence obtained in violation of
the Federal Constitution cannot be used against the defendant at trial.8 2
Thus, items found or seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment's
requirement of reasonableness, which generally requires "probable
cause" for the search and seizure, as well as judicial approval manifest in
a warrant, or a good excuse for not having a warrant, and confessions
obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination or the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, are inadmissible
in evidence. 83 If the excluded evidence is crucial, the prosecution may
move to dismiss or the defendant may be acquitted. As the famous
Benjamin Cardozo said critically of the exclusionary sanction, prior to
his service on the United States Supreme Court: "The criminal goes free
because the constable blundered." 84
For example, if the stop of the car is made without a violation or the
requisite suspicion, the stop is deemed illegal or unconstitutional. All evi-
dence obtained or flowing from such a stop would then be inadmissible
in court as a result of the metaphorically phrased "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine. 85 Thus, evidence obtained after the illegal stop, such as
observation of speech or physical movements, as well as BAC testing, is
inadmissible at trial. Efforts to exclude illegally obtained evidence are
handled before trial at so-called "suppression hearings." Critics call
them "mini-trials," and in fact DUI cases often provide examples of
lengthy suppression hearings followed, when the defense is unsuccessful,
by guilty pleas. 86 Norwegian trials are much less formalistic affairs, at
least concerning rules of evidence. The general rule seems to be one of
common sense evaluation of credibility. 87 In contrast, North Dakota and
82. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92, 398 (1914) (establishing the exclusionary rule
for violation of constitutional rights by federal officers). The exclusionary sanction was extended to
state law enforcement officers through the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment in a landmark
constitutional case, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
83. For a useful discussion of the exclusionary rule specifically as it applies to search and seizure
questions with references also to Fifth and Sixth Amendment applications, see CHARLES H.
WrmEaRAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGnN, CRIMINAL PROCEDuRE, at ch. 2 (3d ed. 1993).
84. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
85. See WHrBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 83, at § 2.04 (providing a discussion of the back-
ground and application of the doctrine).
86. Many DUI-related cases reach the North Dakota Supreme Court through a process referred
to as a conditional guilty plea under Rule 11 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. N.D.
R. Crim. P. 1 (a)(2) (1999). The rule states that if the court and prosecuting attorney consents, "a
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the
judgment, to review the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion. A defendant who
prevails on appeal must be allowed to withdraw the plea." Id.
87. SLET-rAN & 01E, supra note 15, at 525. Stetten and Oie describe, as a main principle of Nor-
wegian criminal procedure, "The principle of free admission of evidence." SLETrAN & 01E, supra
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the United States federal courts have lengthy, complex, and wonderfully
disputable codes of evidence rules.S8 A major course of law school deals
entirely with the rules of evidence, often followed by another course in
trial advocacy which consists in large part of learning how to apply-
some might say manipulate-the rules of evidence to advantage at trial.
B. PLEA BARGAINING
In both Norway and North Dakota, a defendant may plead guilty
and avoid a trial. However, in North Dakota, as is common throughout
United States jurisdictions, the guilty plea is often induced by, or re-
warded with, a concession, generally a reduction in the sentence, a reduc-
tion in the severity of the crime charged, or a dismissal of one or more
of multiple charges against the accused. 89 For many years, despite its
widespread use, many people considered this practice of plea bargaining
to be constitutionally suspect. 90 However, the United States Supreme
Court in 1970 suggested that a concession-induced plea is not invalid
under the United States Constitution. 91 The now-approved practice has
continued to thrive, despite continual criticism from many quarters and
occasional efforts in some jurisdictions to abolish it.92 The specific
note 15, at 525. "It is a principle not specified in statute, that as a main principle the parties may intro-
duce all relevant evidence." SLET7AN & 01E, supra note 15, at 525. But see JoHs. ANDENES, NORSK
STRAFFEPROSESS [NORwEGIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] 241-47 (1994). Andenais suggests that illegally
obtaned evidence may be excluded by judges at their discretion. His discussion does not explicitly
distinguish between constitutional violations and other illegality. Factors a judge may consider in
exercising exclusionary discretion include the reliability or quality of the evidence, the interests
protected by the law violated, and the seriousness of both the illegality and the alleged crime being
tried. Indisputably probative real evidence, like a murder weapon, is discussed as clearly admissible,
in direct contrast to Untied States practice which is noted as such by Andenies. ANDENAES, supra, at
243-44. But Andenims's discussion of less clear cases, such as illegal blood testing (presumably
referring to the extraction of the blood from the suspect) and confessions obtained by illegal methods,
hints that Norwegian results may not always differ as much as the simple "Norway has no
exclusionary rule" statement suggests.
88. For a recent critical and comparative view of our trial system, see WILLIAM T. Pizzi, TRIALS
WITHOUT TRUTH (1999). Particularly insightful and enjoyable is his first chapter, "Soccer, Football,
and Trial Systems," where he compares soccer and American football as a prelude to comparing
European and United States trial systems. Id. at 23. I will leave it to my readers, as an incentive to
read his wonderful book, to guess the referent for his description of "worship of proceduralism, the
attempt to rationalize every aspect of decisionmaking, the distrust of spontaneous action, the heavy
preference for tight control over the participants, and, above all, the daunting complexity of the rules
such a system requires." Id. at 23-24. Pizzi also briefly describes the Norwegian trial system. Id. at
101-04. For a vigorous review essay claiming that Pizzi's critique of the United States system is
overstated and misleading, see Richard S. Frase's Review Essay, "The Search for the Whole Truth
about American and European Criminal Justice," 3 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. (2000) (forthcoming in Issue
2).
89. See generally YALE KAMISAR ET AL., Coerced, Induced and Negotiated Guilty Pleas; Profes-
sional Responsibility: Some Views of Negotiated Pleas Modern Criminal Procedure, in MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1301-13 (1994).
90. Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 HARv. L. REV. 564
(1997).
91. See generally Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (approving a plea induced to avoid
the death penalty by comparison with the practice of plea bargaining).
92. MILLER Er AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 942-50 (4th ed. 1991).
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incentives offered to the defendant are determined for the most part by
the prosecutor who, within the broad range of prosecutorial discretion,
must negotiate a sufficient reduction to induce the defendant's sacrifice
of his right to trial.93 However, the reduction should not be so great as to
offend the integrity of the office, arouse excessive public outrage or, in
light of the final authority vested in the court to approve or disapprove
of the "deal," offend the judge's sense of justice.94
Plea bargaining either to reduced charges such as reckless driving
or in exchange for mild penalties has been a common feature of drunk
driving law in the United States, including North Dakota. Pressure from
groups such as MADD and legislative minimum punishment provisions
have reduced the amount of plea bargaining in DUI cases, but they are
far from eliminating it.
In Norway, the official or standard position is that plea bargaining
does not exist. However, modem developments in Norway's "war on
drugs" and complicated economic crime prosecutions cast some doubt
about correspondence between the official position and the "law on the
streets" or in practice.95 A famous case many years ago against a
wealthy shipping line owner involving numerous counts of serious
economic crime ended with a guilty plea to one minor offense with
minimum penalty. 96 Nonetheless, it is doubtful that anything like North
Dakota plea bargaining takes place in Norway, except perhaps as an
occasional aberration.
93. Id. at 946.
94. The judge can accept, reject, or defer his or her decision pending a presentence investigation
once a plea agreement has been placed before the court. See N.D. R. CRIM. P. lI(d)(2) (1999). But
see United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding, under the specific facts of the
case, that the trial court should have accepted a plea agreement based on a prosecutor's recommenda-
tion for the agreement which would protect a later criminal action by the government). In State v.
Thompson, the North Dakota Supreme Court refused to allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea
when the judge imposed a sentence more severe than the non-binding plea agreement entered into by
the prosecution and defense. State v. Thompson, 504 N.W.2d 315 (N.D. 1993); see also State v.
Halton, 535 N.W.2d 734 (N.D. 1995) (holding a defendant could not withdraw a guilty plea when a
judge sentenced the defendant to a substantially longer sentence than the prosecutor's recom-
mendation); Lockney, supra note 48, at 1007-10 (discussing the court's refusal to honor a prosecutor's
recommendation).
95. Norway might do well to heed the developments described in Joachim Herrmann, Bargaining
Justice-A Bargain For German Criminal Justice?, 53 U. Pirr. L. REV. 755 (1992), which begins:
"The administration of criminal justice in Germany has undergone dramatic changes in recent years.
Bargaining over charges and sentences and settling cases have become common practice, even
though they previously were considered repugnant to the principles and tradition of German criminal
justice." Although the history and context may differ significantly, a similar process may well be
under way in Norway.
96. In light of that case, the continued assurance by Norwegian experts that plea bargaining is
foreign to Norway seems to me analogous to the widespread antipathy expressed by most North
Dakotans to "socialism," notwithstanding the state-owned bank and mill constituting the state's two
largest industries.
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C. DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
1. Right to an Attorney
In both Norway and North Dakota, a defendant has the right to be
represented by an attorney. The critical issue, however, is what triggers
the right of an accused to have the assistance of a defense lawyer at state
expense. In Norway, a criminal defendant has the right to a state-paid
defense attorney in most cases, but not for a DUI case unless special
circumstances exist.97 If the description of DUI cases as being "cut and
dried" in Norway is accurate, it would then naturally follow that such
''special circumstances" are infrequently found.
In North Dakota, the issue is more complicated. The Sixth Amend-
ment to the Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, provides that an indigent accused has
the right to counsel at state expense in any case where a jail sentence is
actually imposed.98 Great conceptual and practical difficulties arise in
trying to administer this rule for the common sense reason that the trial
court must determine whether to appoint counsel before the trial and
sentencing processes; in other words, it must guess whether there will be
a jail sentence before it knows anything about the case. As a practical
matter, many North Dakota judges, at the initial appearance of the defen-
dant, ask the prosecution whether it intends to reserve the possibility of
recommending a jail sentence. If so, counsel is appointed. If not, the
defendant gets good and bad news from the court: the good news is, "I
will not send you to jail"; the bad news is, "You have to defend yourself
or hire your own defense attorney."
If that is not complicated, or perhaps even absurd, enough, North
Dakota has additional complications for DUI cases. Repeat offenses
carry statutory mandatory jail sentences. 99 The North Dakota Supreme
Court has held that the North Dakota state constitution's guarantee of
the right to counsel does not permit a defendant to be sentenced to jail as
a repeat offender without proof that the defendant either had, or volun-
tary waived the offer of, counsel in the previous case(s).100 As a result,
some judges are now appointing counsel in all cases, even first offenses,
97. Straffeprosessloven [The Criminal Procedure Act] §§ 96 & 100.
98. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding there is a right to counsel for
indigent defendants in misdemeanor cases involving a jail term); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,
373-74 (1979) (holding there is no right to counsel when the defendant does not get an actual jail
sentence for violating a statute that provides imprisonment as a possibility).
99. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(4) (1999).
100. State v. Ofr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 174-80 (N.D. 1985).
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in order to preserve the right to jail the defendant for subsequent
offenses. 101
2. Role of the Defense Attorney
A "chicken and egg" problem-"which comes first, the chicken
or the egg?"-is presented in considering the role of Norwegian and
North Dakota DUI defense lawyers. Lawyers in the United States are
required by codes of ethical conduct to provide "zealous" advocacy for
the defendant.' 02 This tone of the zeal was evident at a national seminar
for DUI defense lawyers, attended by the author just prior to first travel-
ing to Norway to study its DUI law.1 03 At least one lawyer from
forty-seven states was in attendance, including three from North Dakota.
Two full days were devoted to methods and tactics of defending DUI
cases and focused on ways to avoid the perceived excesses of the
"get-tough-on-drunk-driving" movement as manifest in legislative
efforts to pass tougher statutes and police and prosecution efforts to
enforce more vigorously the legislation.104
101. The reason some judges do not follow that practice may be a realistic appraisal of economic
considerations, in light of the fact that the municipalities and counties must bear the expense of court
appointed attorneys. I myself have experienced situations as a municipal judge in which a city
prosecutor dismissed the charge rather than subject the city budget to the expense of an appointed
defense attorney. An unclear factor in all of this is the arguably theoretical nature of the issue, despite
its practical consequences, in light of the careful or clever judge's ability to sentence the offender to
jail in a repeat case under the general misdemeanor sentencing discretion (0-30 days in jail)
irrespective of the "mandatory" legislative penalty for the repeat offense. See generally NORTH
DAKOTA MUNICIPAL COURT BENCH3OOK at 111-23 to -24 (1997) (discussing right to counsel, the Orr
decision, and waiver of right to counsel).
102. See MODEL RuLES OFPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble 2 (1997); see also N.D. R. PROF.
CONDUCT Preamble, Rule 1.3 cmt. (1997).
103. Third National Seminar: Getting Tough on DWI: The Defense, Sponsored by The Minne-
sota Society for Criminal Justice & The Washington Foundation for Criminal Justice, Orlando, Florida
(Mar. 4-5, 1988).
104. The "war" has scarcely diminished in intensity since 1988. For example, the January/Febru-
ary 2000 issue of "The Champion," the journal of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, continues a longstanding column devoted to defense of DUI and entitled "The .10% Solu-
tion." The January/February column, by Christian Samuelson and Gary Trichter, both practicing
defense lawyers, is entitled "DWI Defense Witness Preparation: How to Compete with the Testimony
of Experienced Police Witnesses." It begins:
In the era of MADD Mothers and .08 legislation, DWI prosecutions have become both
political and competitive. They are "political" in the sense that politicians and judges
alike use anti-DWI sentiment as a banner to gamer votes. They are "competitive" in the
sense that many police officers and other state witnesses testify only to win and not to do
justice. DWI trials are also competitive from a prosecution standpoint because of the
need to avoid the political embarrassment that a "not guilty" verdict can bring. Here, it is
important to note that in most every jurisdiction around the country, no other crime is
litigated as often as DWl and moreover, no other prosecution ends in a not guilty verdict
more than that of DWI.
Accordingly, in this political and competitive context, it must be remembered that DWI is
an opinion crime. Generally speaking, the jury is forced to rely on the opinions of the
arresting officers in arriving at its verdict. In most cases these opinions will be sufficient
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It is likely that such a seminar would be unthinkable in Norway.
Hence the chicken and egg problem: Is the advocacy of the Norwegian
defense bar subdued because the statutes, rules of evidence, permissible
trial tactics, and public and judicial attitudes preclude a vigorous de-
fense? Or, are the tools of a vigorous defense lacking because the
defense lawyers share the general moralistic attitude of Norwegian
society reflected in the discrimination against DUI defendants, notably
the lack of a general right to appointed counsel? 05
North Dakota lawyers seek to suppress evidence by claiming it was
illegally obtained, vigorously plea bargain, and, if a plea bargain is not
negotiated, often take cases to juries. Occasionally enough to justify
their efforts, they convince juries that the police officer made a mistake,
or the scientific evidence is untrustworthy, or perhaps that a merciful
acquittal is justified on the subtly argued (because technically impermis-
sible) adage that "there but for the grace of God go 1."106
3. Jury Trials
A simple but misleading comparison would simply state that in
North Dakota DUI defendants are entitled to a jury trial; in Norway they
are not. However, such a statement is misleading if one considers the
purpose of a jury to be public participation in judicial decisions.
In Norway, a defendant who does not plead guilty is first tried in the
Herredsrett (township court) or Byrett (city court), both of which consist
of one professional (law-trained) and two lay judges.107 After convic-
tion, it is theoretically possible to get a new trial in the Lagmannsrett
(Court of Appeal) with a court consisting generally of three professional
and four lay judges.108
evidence to persuade the jury to convict your client because the officers who testify
against your client have been well-schooled and battle educated on the stand.
Christian Samuelson & Gary Trichter, DWI Defense Witness Preparation: How to Compete with the
Testimony of Experienced Police Witnesses, THE CHAMPION, January/February 2000. For a flavor of
the opposing side, visit the web site of Mothers Against Drunk Driving at <http://www.madd.org/>.
105. Straffeprosessloven [The Criminal Procedure Act] §§ 96 & 100.
106. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 281 (1993)
(describing traditional ambivalence about the seriousness of drunk driving as reflected in a classic jury
study by Harry Kaiven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel, entitled The American Jury, at 293-97 (1966)). Friedman
describes the movement to change that attitude spearheaded by the founding of Remove Intoxicated
Drivers (RID) in 1979 and Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) in 1980, which he claims
recriminalized drunk driving, with questionable deterrent results, causing him to conclude that "the
campaign against drunk driving tends to make more of a mark on paper than it does in terms of real
deterrence, or even in terms of severity of punishment." Id. at 281-82.
107. SLETrAN & OlE, supra note 15, at 530.
108. The bases for appeals, the composition of the court hearing the appeal, and the procedural
rules for determining the processing and filtering of appeals have become especially complex after
recent revisions in Norway effective 1995. Since it is rare that a DUI case is appealed on issues of
guilt or innocence, those complexities are beyond the scope of this article. See generally
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NORWAY (3d ed. 1998).
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In North Dakota, every DUI defendant has the same right to a jury
trial (six member jury) as any other misdemeanor defendant. 109 So-
called administrative or non-criminal (civil) traffic offenses are handled
with a different procedure,l10 but serious traffic offenses, such as DUI,
reckless driving, and driving without a suspended or revoked license, are
all retained as misdemeanors subject to all the normal misdemeanor
procedures, including a jury trial. 111
4. Appeals"12
A significant feature of the Norwegian system, discussed below in
Part IV. E, is appellate review of sentences. In North Dakota, and the
United States generally, the prosecution has a very limited right to
appeal, based on tradition and a long and very complicated history of
judicial development of the federal constitutional prohibition against
being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense."l 3 Norway has no
similar prohibitions, and it is probable that the majority of appeals in
DUI cases are taken and won by prosecutors. If that impression is
correct, it is interesting to contemplate the ability, if any, of an unrepre-
sented defendant to appeal, the chances of success if an appeal is legally
and practically possible, and the effects on the "common law" of DUI
in Norway if the answer to either question is little or none.
IV. SANCTIONS: CRIMINAL PENALTIES AND OTHERWISE
A. JAIL AND FINE
The most famous aspect of Norwegian DUI law was until recently
the mandatory unsuspended twenty-one days minimum jail sentence.11 4
109. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-17-12 (1991). The North Dakota right to ajury trial is broader
than the federal right, which generally requires imprisonment of over six months. See Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
110. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.1-02 (1991) (setting forth procedures for disposition of non-crimi-
nal traffic offenses).
111. N.D. C ENr. C ODE § 39-06.1-05 (1997) (excluding DUI, reckless driving, driving without a
license, and other serious offenses from procedures for non-criminal offenses).
112. The general structure and nature of appeals from DUI convictions in North Dakota and Nor-
way is reasonably similar. A complete discussion would require a detailed description of the two court
systems and appellate procedures. That discussion is avoided in this article for the sake of brevity.
See generally, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NORWAY, supra note 108.
113. For an analysis of the history and development of double jeopardy, see J. SIGLAR, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY: THE DEvE.opMEqT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL PoucY (1969).
114. Andenges, in SOCIALCoTRrOL, supra note 1, at 48-49. Even the "mandatory" three week
unsuspended sentence, however, was not imposed in about 15% of the cases; the exceptional
suspended sentences were handed out to very young or old defendants, or defendants for whom the
prison time would have had serious psychological consequences.
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This feature, initiated in the 1920s, was not changed by parliament until
1988.115 The severity of the minimum twenty-one day unsuspended jail
sentence was amplified by comparison with the normal wide discretion
afforded to Norwegian courts for other crimes and the wide use of
suspended sentences for other first offenders. The length, however, must
be put in the context of the fact that for many years, in fact until 1985,
the minimum length of incarceration for any crime in Norway was
twenty-one days, a feature that I personally never saw mentioned in
United States articles touting the severity of Norwegian DUI sentencing.
On the other hand, it is also indicative of the Norwegian attitude toward
DUI, as reflected by acts of Parliament, that when the general minimum
sentence of twenty-one days was lowered to fourteen, the change affect-
ed all crimes except DUI, a situation that lasted from 1985 until the
sweeping revision of DUI punishment in 1988.116
The situation after 1988 is more complex. Perhaps the clearest and
simplest exposition of the current situation is contained in a basic
criminal law treatise written for Norwegian law students which explains as
follows: 117
Punishment Range
The punishment for drunk driving is fines or imprison-
ment up to one year. According to legislative history, restraint
should be exercised in imposing community service for drunk
driving.
The Act Gives More Precise Directions for the Imposition of
Punishment
In 1988 we received rules which lack counterparts in
Norwegian criminal law: Rules were established in the act
regarding imposition of punishment in drunk driving cases.
Additional directions were provided in the preparatory works.
The act operates with three grades of seriousness: BAC
between .05% and .10%; between .10% and .15%; and over
.15%. There is moreover a special provision for imposition of
punishment for repeat drunk driving, which applies irrespective
of the degree of BAC.
The punishment increases as the level of BAC rises. Fines
and imprisonment should normally be imposed in all cases.
115. Vegtrafikkloven [The Road Traffic Act] § 31.3.
116. ANDEN&S & BRATHOLM, supra note 10, at 337 (describing this situation as "scarcely
reasonable").
117. S=mrAN & 0ia, supra note 15, at 494-96. The translation quoted in the text omits the section
numbers, parenthetical citations of authorities, and footnotes contained in the Norwegian treatise.
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The difference is whether the imprisonment should be sus-
pended or unsuspended and how long it lasts.
The Three Levels of Influence
With a BAC from .051% to .10% the punishment as a rule
is a fine and suspended or prison sentence. According to the
preparatory works, the imprisonment should normally be from
fourteen to twenty-one days.
With BAC between .10% .to .15%, the punishment should
usually be a fine suspended or unsuspended prison. Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court practice the line between suspended
and unsuspended prison is in the vicinity between .115% and
.13% when there is nothing remarkable about the driving.
Suspended sentences should normally be 21 to 30 days, while
unsuspended sentences should be from 14 to 30 days.
For BAC over .15% the normal punishment is fine and
unsuspended prison. The term of imprisonment should
usually be from 21 to 36 days.
The division according to levels of influence is not abso-
lute, see "as a rule" language in the introduction to the
statutory provision. The punishment can deviate from the
normal where the situation is more, or less, serious than usual.
With drunk driving on a moped on a private road without any
other traffic, the prison sentence may be suspended, even
though the BAC is high. The same can result when the drunk
driver has psychological problems or other special personal
circumstances exist. One who drives under the influence and at
high speed past a grade school at school time may, on the other
hand, receive an unsuspended jail sentence despite a low BAC.
It may also be appropriate to impose only a fine or only
imprisonment. * * *
The court has a rather wide range of discretion. The Act
to be sure specifies what should be emphasized: the level of
alcohol influence and the danger the driving has occasioned.
But those are factors, which the court would in any event have
considered. Weight may also be placed on other sentencing
factors.
Repeat Drunk Driving
Repeat drunk driving should be punished with fine and
unsuspended imprisonment, irrespective of how low the illegal
BAC is. The statutory provision has no reservation of excep-
tional cases, as with the first offense provision. Nevertheless, it
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has happened that suspended sentences are imposed with repeat
drunk driving. The preparatory works state that the length of
the prison term should be "increased considerably" with
repeat offenses.
Imposition of the Fine
The preparatory works also provide guidelines for imposi-
tion of fines. The Criminal Law Commission, which prepared
the amendment, suggested that the fine should normally
correspond to a month's pay with a deduction for taxes. But
in the view of the Department of Justice and Parliament, a more
appropriate amount was a month and a half's pay without a
deduction for taxes. And the fine should-whatever the
offender's income-only in exceptional cases be under 10,000
kroner [approximately $1,300].
Practice in a series of court cases has imposed a fine
considerably lower than 10,000 kroner because of the convict-
ed person's economic situation or ability to pay.
The Supreme Court has opined that the fine in drunk
driving cases should, as a point of departure, not be affected by
the size of the BAC or by the dangerousness of the driving.
Such circumstances are relevant only to the choice between
suspended and unsuspended sentences of imprisonment and to
the length of the prison sentence.
In North Dakota, there is no mandatory jail sentence for the first
offense.'I8 The defendant may be sentenced from one to thirty days in
jail, and fined up to $1000, or may receive a combination of jail sentence
and fine.119 A jail sentence and a fine may be suspended, but only in
certain instances. 120 The sentencing options for the first time DUI are
for the most part consistent with all other class B misdemeanors, 12 1
except for the minimum $250 fine, 122 which differs from the usual range
of $0 - $1000.123
118. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(4)(a) (1999).
119. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(2) (1999); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01 (1997).
120. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(4)(e) (1999). The statute allows suspension for a conviction
of actual physical control or if the defendant is under 18 years of age (unless previously convicted of
DUI in the preceding five years). Id.
121. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01 (1997).
122. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(4)(a) (1999).
123. Additionally, offenders convicted of DUI must, as a part of their sentence, obtain an addic-
tion evaluation from an approved addiction treatment center. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(4)(a)
(1999).
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Another important comparison is the nature of the prison or jail to
which the convicted driver is sent. In Norway, most men serve their DUI
sentences in minimum-security institutions under conditions that even by
Norway's relatively progressive penal standards, internationally speak-
ing, are considered light compared to those for other prisoners.124 The
conditions for women DUI convicts are not so easy because their smaller
number has apparently precluded creation of special prison conditions
for female DUI convicts.
In North Dakota, prisoners are generally sent either to the county or
regional jail, or to one of two minimum-security facilities, the Missouri
River Correctional Center or the James River Correctional Center, both
run by, but physically separate from, North Dakota's single penitentiary.
Although prisoners do not describe either the jails or the minimum-
security facilities as easy, the minimum-security facilities are likely
considered preferable to the penitentiary.
Both Norway and North Dakota provide increased punishment for
repeat offenders. In Norway, as explained above in the excerpt from the
Norwegian criminal law treatise, one may get unsuspended jail time for a
second offense even if the BAC was just over the limit (.05%).125 In
North Dakota, minimum, mandatory unsuspended jail sentences, e.g.,
four days for the second offense, are imposed only on repeat
offenders. 126 One interesting aspect of the difference is that North
Dakota's legislation is an obvious effort to curb the perceived leniency
of courts; Norway's pre-1988 practice of unsuspended prison sentences
was imposed by the Supreme Court itself, without overt legislative
coercion. 127
Repeat offenders in North Dakota face additional sanctions, such as
the mandatory minimum four day's imprisonment (or ten days com-
munity service), a minimum fine of $500, and an alcohol evaluation for
a second offense within five years. 128 A third offense within five years
results in a minimum sixty days imprisonment, a fine of one thousand
124. H. LAuREUcE Ross, CoNFRoNTNG DRUNK DRIVING 67 (1992) (pointing out that most DUI jail
terms in the U.S. are served in austere county jails, whereas the "much longer" sentences in Norway
are served in institutions that "more closely resembled those of a budget motel in this country"). There
has been a problem in Norway with long waits for service of DUI sentences because of the large
number of convicted drivers, relative to convictions for other crimes, and available prison space. I
have heard conflicting reports about whether this problem has been resolved.
125. Vegtrafikkloven [The Road Traffic Act] § 31.3.
126. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(4)(b) (Supp. 1999) (requiring imposition of either four days
imprisonment or 10 days community service).
127. The Norwegian Supreme Court began the practice of unsuspended sentences based on
preparatory works for the 1936 per se legislation suggesting that jail sentences for drunk driving
should be unsuspended, actual jail sentences. RAGNAR HAUGE & JENS J. GAUSLUND, STRAFFUTMALINGEN I
PROMILLESAKER [IMPosMoN OF PuNiSHMENT IN DRUNK DrIviNG CAsES] 12 (1992).
128. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(4)(b) (Supp. 1999).
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dollars, and an alcohol evaluation. 129 A fourth or subsequent offense
within seven years results in a minimum 180 days imprisonment and a
fine of $1,000.130
B. PUBLICITY
In Norway, little or no publicity is traditionally given to criminal
convictions, including DUI cases, except in newsworthy cases such as
when a public official is a defendant. For example, a police chief was
mentioned by name as a defendant in a Norwegian DUI case. I have
been told that other famous defendants have been named by the media,
e.g., well-known sports or entertainment figures. A somewhat broader
interpretation of newsworthiness seems to apply for some serious or
spectacular crimes like murder, embezzlement, or fraud involving large
sums of money or public trust. This limitation is a result of media
practice, and the difference is striking. However, there is nothing in
Norway to compare to the daily newspaper publication of lists of convic-
tions or court reports in some North Dakota newspapers. The author
discovered this difference when asking some Norwegian law student
friends about how neighbors and acquaintances might react to a Norwe-
gian's three-week disappearance because of a DUI conviction. The
author was informed that often the friends and relatives are unaware of
such a conviction. Often the convict tells his friends he is on vacation,
and reportedly one Norwegian entrepreneur offers a service whereby
postcards are taken to Greece or the Canary Islands in order to obtain
129. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(4)(c) (Supp. 1999).
130. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(4)(d) (Supp. 1999).
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appropriate postmarks before being mailed back to the convict's friends
in Norway. 131
C. CONFISCATION OF LICENSE PLATES OR MOTOR VEHICLE
In Norway, the Road Traffic Act authorizes the police to forbid the
use of a vehicle by a convicted drunk driver, and other dangerous traffic
offenders, for up to one year and, if necessary, to confiscate the license
plates, registration card, or even the vehicle itself for the designated
period. 132 These provisions are used often. Less frequent is forfeiture
of the vehicle, which may be ordered by the court under the general
forfeiture provision in the Criminal Code, which provides, "Instead of
confiscating the object the court may impose measures to prevent the
object being used for the commission of new offenses." 133 In North
Dakota, confiscation of license plates is permitted by statute, 134 and
forfeiture and sale of a motor vehicle is permitted by court order at the
131. An article in Motor, the monthly magazine of the Norwegian Automobile Association,
describes Ilseng, nicknamed "Costa del Ilseng," a prison work colony near Hamar for persons
convicted of drunk driving under a headline reading "Mother-in-law believes I'm Down South."
Rune Korsvoll, At Ilseng for Drunk Driving: Mother-in-Law Believes I'm Down South, MOTOR, May
1988, at 8-9. Describing the relaxed conditions as vacation-like, a prisoner claims the food is better
than he is used to at home. Id. When asked whether the conditions are sufficiently frightful to deter
future drunk driving, the prisoner replies that conditions are not at all frightful; the worst part, he
claims, is to calm a nervous mother and mother-in-law, or to find a believable explanation for being
away for three weeks. Id. In response to a question about whether it is still usual to make up an
excuse, the prisoner responds that it sounds that way among the fellows at Ilseng. Id. He claims that a
three-week vacation in the south is the usual explanation, but that going to a seminar was becoming
increasingly common as an excuse. Id. The prisoner supports the claim that it is still embarrassing to
admit one is serving time for drunk driving by telling the story of a prisoner who saw a familiar looking
older man in the food line; it turned out to be his father, whom he believed to be at a seminar, while the
father thought the son was on vacation in the south. Id. at 10.
For readers unfamiliar with Norwegian vacation and travel habits, it should be pointed out that an
astonishing number of Norwegians take vacations each year to "the South" including places like the
Canary Islands, Spain, Greece, or Bulgaria, most using inexpensive charter flights and travel packages
that make it cheaper to vacation far to the south than at home in comparatively expensive Norway. In
addition, it should be pointed out that most Norwegians conveniently (for persons sentenced for drunk
driving) get four weeks of yearly paid vacation time. ARNE SELBYG, NORWAY TODAY 25 (1986).
132. Vegtraf-kkloven [The Road Traffic Act] § 36.
133. Vegtrafikkloven [The Road Traffic Act] § 35. Andenws & Bratholm describe the "great
reluctance" of courts to forfeit vehicles because of the wide disparity in values of vehicles.
Moreover, the forfeiture is only possible if the convicted driver owns the vehicle. See ANDEN)ES &
BRATHOLM, supra note 10, at 343. The 1988 amendments' preparatory works suggested a possible
increase in the use of forfeiture, while also observing that forbidding use and taking the license plates
by the police under the Road Traffic Act § 36 can accomplish much of the same preventive effects.
Further, although the police confiscation is limited to one year, it may be used not only against the
offender's vehicle but also one regularly used with the owner's consent. ANDEN Es & BRATHOLM,
supra note 10, at 343.
134. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(3) (Supp. 1999).
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time of sentencing.135 These options are seldom used, however, proba-
bly because of hardships caused to family members needing to use the
vehicle. 136
D. EVALUATION AND TREATMENT OF ALCOHOL PROBLEMS
Both Norway and North Dakota envision treatment as an alternative
to traditional punitive measures. 137 In Norway, a convicted driver may
be given a suspended sentence conditioned upon participation in a
treatment program, 138 and a prisoner may be transferred to a treatment
institution. Both options are used rarely.1 39
In North Dakota, a court may sentence a defendant directly to a
treatment program in lieu of jail.140 Moreover, the DUI legislation
requires that every driver convicted of DUI be evaluated at a state
approved alcohol evaluation center. 141 The driver must pay a fee to the
institution for the evaluation. The evaluation is reported to the State
Department of Transportation; before the convicted driver's privilege to
drive will be reinstated in North Dakota and other compact member
states, the Department of Transportation must receive a report of satisfac-
tory compliance with any treatment recommendation contained in the
evaluation report.142
135. N.D. CEW. CODE § 39-08-01.3 (Supp. 1999).
136. Ignition interlock devices may also be ordered pursuant to N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01.3
(1999). A colleague has previously suggested vehicle confiscation and sale of motor vehicles
operated by drunken drivers. Larry Kraft, The Drive to Stop the Drunk from Driving: Suggested Civil
Approaches, 59 N.D. L. REV. 391 (1983). New York City has recently taken a very aggressive and
controversial approach under its administrative code, promising to seize and forfeit cars of arrested
drunk drivers. For a report of the announcement of the program, see Sean Gardiner, Drink and
Walk/Safir [New York Police Commissioner]: Cars to Be Locked Up in DWI Arrests, NEWSDAY, Jan.
22, 1997, at A7, available in 1999 WL 8153627. A defense attorney defending a client against the
new policy paints a very critical picture, claiming many defects including lack of notice, seizure
without prior judicial hearings, selective prosecution, and violation of the excessive fines clause of the
Eighth Amendment. Steven L. Kessler, The City's New DWI Forfeiture Laws Fail the Constitutional
Challenge, N.Y.L.J., July 8, 1999, at I. For another defense lawyer's critical review of New York
and other "big cities across America" adoption of "draconian local ordinances," see David B. Smith,
Cities Fight 'Quality of Life' Offenses with Forfeiture Blunderbuss, THE CHAMPION, Mar. 2000, at 28.
Minnesota allows vehicle forfeiture after multiple offenses. See MINN. STAT. § 169.1217 (1998).
137. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-32-021(!)(g) (1997), 39-08-01(4)(a) (1999).
138. Vegtrafikloven [The Road Traffic Act] § 31 (specifying the range of punishment for those
convicted of drunk driving); Straffeloven [The Criminal Code] § 53 (allowing, as a condition of a
suspended sentence, the imposition of in-patient treatment); see SLETTAN & OE, supra note 15, at 496
(explaining how the two provisions interact).
139. Special drunk driving treatment programs imposed as conditions of suspended sentences
were first instituted on a trial basis in 1995 in only five countries. SLETTAN & 0IE, supra note 15, at
496.
140. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(4)(g) (Supp. 1999).
141. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(4) (Supp. 1999).
142. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.1-10(3.1)(a) (Supp. 1999).
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.Because of the requirement of treatment in North Dakota before
driver's license privileges are reinstated, it appears evaluation and
treatment of the drunk driver are deemed more important in North
Dakota than in Norway. Important questions regarding the efficacy and
fairness of a system of coerced treatment are of continuing concern in
both Norway and North Dakota.
E. APPELLATE REVIEw OF SENTENCING
The main exception to the description of DUI in Norway as "cut
and dried" 143 is probably the issue of sentencing. Norway has a system
whereby appellate courts may review the length and nature of criminal
sentences. This has lead to an extensive "common law" (judge made)
of sentencing in Norway, and it includes DUI sentences. A survey of
Norwegian Supreme Court decisions in all DUI cases from 1975 through
1987 uses 211 of its 306 pages, more than two thirds, to summarize
sentencing decisions. 144
In contrast, North Dakota, as is true generally in the United States, 145
allows appellate review of sentences only if the sentence is "illegal." 46
In theory, an illegal sentence is one that is either outside the range set by
the legislature, so severe as to constitute "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution or a state constitution's analog, 147 or invidiously discrimina-
tory. In practice, especially in the context of DUI, this means no signifi-
cant appellate review of sentences.
North Dakota's severe limitation of appellate review of sentencing
judges' discretion is quite difficult to understand and impossible to
explain to Norwegian colleagues, especially in light of our society's
purported commitment to a "rule of law." As a part-time judge who
sentences convicted drunk drivers in North Dakota, I find my virtually
unreviewable power to sentence a drunk driver to, as a general rule, from
143. See supra text at section III.A.
144. PER OTrO BORGEN & ANNA HOGSET, HOYESTERE1IrS AVGJORELSER I PROMILLESAKER 1975-
1987 [SUPREME COURT'S DECmsioNs IN DUI CASES 1975-19871 (1988).
145. See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 559 (1968). The
movement toward sentencing guidelines in federal courts and some states is changing this situation and
indeed might be seen as moving criminal appeals in the United States closer to those in Norway. But
there is no strong movement toward sentencing guidelines in North Dakota state prosecutions.
146. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMIAL PROCEDURE 1099 (2d ed. 1992). Although
the tradition of limited review of sentencing has been rejected in "a substantial number of states," id.
at 1100, North Dakota is not one of them.
147. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Article I, section I I of the North Dakota Constitution is North
Dakota's counterpart to the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
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zero to thirty days in jail, and to impose a fine varying from nothing to
$1,000, to be astonishing.148
F. Loss OF DRIVING PRIVILEGES
1. At Arrest
In Norway, if a driver is arrested and subjected to a blood test, his or
her driver's license may be confiscated by the police until the case is
finished. 149 However, the police are not entitled to keep the license for
more than three weeks without court approval. 150 In practice, the defen-
dant normally gets the license back if the blood test is negative (.05% or
less). The decision is quicker when the police themselves determine the
BAC with a breath test. 151 Remarkably, the accused has a right to com-
pensation for costs resulting from confiscation of the driver's license if
the case is dismissed or ends in acquittal.152
In North Dakota, if a driver refuses chemical testing or is found to
have a BAC of .10% or more, he or she receives a temporary twenty-five
day driving certificate.1 53 Within ten days, the driver must request a
hearing before an administrative hearing officer from the Department of
Transportation. 5 4 If the driver does not request such a hearing, or is
found at the hearing to have been over the .10% limit, driving privileges
are suspended for ninety-one days.155 The period of suspension would
be longer than ninety-one days if the suspension is for a subsequent
offense within a specified time period. 156
148. It is possible for a driver convicted in North Dakota municipal court to appeal to the district
court for a trial anew. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-18-19. If the driver is convicted again, the district judge
then has the same wide sentencing discretion as the judge at the first trial and the limitations on review
described in the text apply to the second sentence.
149. Vegtrafikkloven [The Road Traffic Act] § 33.
150. Id.
151. ANDENsS & BRA'mOLM, supra note 10, at 353.
152. ANDEMES & BRAThOLM, supra note 10, at 353 (citing Straffeprossessloven [Code of Criminal
Procedure] § 438, which provides for criminal prosecutions generally that acquittal or waiver of
prosecution entitle the defendant to compensation awarded by the court for necessary expenses,
including travel, incurred in the defense "unless he himself willfully incurred suspicion").
153. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-03.1(1) (1999). The procedure differs for blood tests because the
results of a blood test are not known for up to several weeks following a DUI arrest. In that case, a
driver retains his or her license until the blood test results are returned to the arresting officer. Once
the blood test results are obtained, the arresting officer then serves the 25 day driving certificate.
154. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-05(1) (1997).
155. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-04.1 (Supp. 1999).
156. Id.
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2. Revocation of Driving Privileges Upon Conviction
In both Norway and North Dakota, a person convicted of DUI loses
driving privileges. In Norway, the loss is for a minimum of one year, 157
but in practice, the period is often set longer, for example two years, even
for a first offense. 158 If a driver refuses to cooperate with a blood
alcohol test, the license is revoked for a minimum of two years. For
repeat offenders, the license is by statute to be taken "for alltid," or for-
ever. 159 In practice, however, "forever" normally means five years.160
The revocation in Norway is administered by the police, not by the
courts, and thus is an administrative procedure not considered "punish-
ment." As Andenes and Bratholm , two of Norway's foremost criminal
law experts observe, however:
Realistically seen, revocation is close to punishment because it
has the same primary purposes: general and individual preven-
tion. One affected by revocation normally experiences it as
punishment, often a more severe punishment than an
unsuspended jail sentence. Professional drivers are affected
especially hard since revocation leads to loss of one's job, in
any event for the period of revocation. 161
Official proposals have suggested that the courts should administer
revocation, but they have been opposed by the Ministry of Justice, which
takes the position that the existing, police-administered system is less
costly and consistent with the rule of law because of the right to appeal
revocations to the ministry. Andenas and Bratholm also note that an
argument against the administrative scheme that has become increasingly
weighty is based on inconsistency with Article 6 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights.162
In North Dakota, the revocation process is also handled as an
administrative and thus civil, or non-criminal, matter, administered by the
Department of Transportation.1 63 Revocation resulting from a DUI is at
least ninety-one days for a first offense, but it may be longer if the driver
157. Vegtrafikkloven [The Road Traffic Act] § 33.
158. AND NEs & BRAToLm, supra note 10, at 351.
159. Vegtrafikkloven [The Road Traffic Act] § 33.
160. ANDENEs & BRATimOM, supra note 10, at 351.
161. ArNENFS & BRA'moLM, supra note 10, at 252.
162. ANDNEs & BRATmoLM, supra note 10, at 252.
163. See Asbridge v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 291 N.W.2d 739, 750 (N.D. 1980).
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has accumulated points from "moving traffic violations" resulting in
the assessment of legislatively assigned points. 164
G. EFFECTS ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
1 6 5
Both Norway and North Dakota require a minimum level of insur-
ance coverage for motor vehicles. 166 Driving a vehicle without the
required coverage is a criminal offense, although in Norway the punish-
ment is limited to a fine, while in North Dakota the offense is a misde-
meanor with a minimum fine of $150 that may not be suspended and a
potential jail sentence of up to thirty days.167 In Norway, damages
caused by a drunk driver are covered by the applicable insurance policy,
but the insurance company has the right to reimbursement. 168 However,
the insurance company is not responsible for damages suffered to the
drunk drivers own person or property.169 In North Dakota, damages are
covered, but the insured's coverage is usually canceled. If not canceled,
or upon a resumption of coverage, the driver's insurance premium rate
will be increased dramatically. 170
164. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.1-10(7) (1999). The suspension period is 91 days if the defendant
has no previous DUI conviction within the past five years, 365 days for once violating the DUI statute
within the preceding five years, and two years for two or more DUI convictions in the preceding five
years. Id. Claims that administrative revocation constitutes double jeopardy have been rejected by the
North Dakota Supreme Court, which rejects the notion that the revocation is punishment by switching
the label from "punitive" to "remedial." See State v. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d 49 (N.D. 1995) (reject-
ing a federal constitutional claim); see also State v. Jacobson, 545 N.W.2d 152 (N.D. 1996) (rejecting
a state constitutional claim).
165. For a general discussion of the insurance and other civil law consequences of drunk driving
in the United States, see James B. Jacobs, The Impact of Insurance and Civil Law Sanctions on Drunk
Driving, in SociAL CoNtrot, supra note 1, at 227.
166. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-20 (1999); Bilansvarslova [The Automobile Responsibility Act]
§ 15.
167. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-20 (1999); Bilansvarslova [ The Automobile Responsibility Act] §
20.
168. Bilansvarslova [The Automobile Responsibility Act] § 12.1; R.N. TORGERSEN & BIORN
ENGSTROM, RETirBAK RATrET [14w BEHND THE WHEEL] 47 (1984). Torgersen and Engstrom indicate
that, in practice, insurance companies who pay for damages caused by drunk drivers seek
compensation from most drunk drivers with sufficient assets. TORGERSEN & ENGSTROM, supra, at 47.
They also warn passengers that although they may not be punished or lose their driver's license for
riding with a drunk driver, they do risk losing compensation from the vehicle's insurer for damages
suffered during the trip. TORGERSEN & ENGSTROM, supra, at 47. "We have examples where passengers
became 100% disabled for life, but were refused compensation because they let themselves be
transported in a car even though they were aware that the driver was influenced." TORGERSEN &
ENGSTROM, supra, at 47.
169. TORGERSEN & ENGSTROM, supra note 168, at 47.
170. See generally James B. Jacobs, The Impact of Insurance and Civil Law Sanctions on Drunk
Driving, in SoCIAL CONTROL, supra note 1, at 226.
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V. CONCLUSION
Although this article is entitled a "comparison," it is not necessarily
a comparative law project, in the reform-oriented sense of most recent
comparative law scholarship in the United States. Its origins and purpose
are much more modest. The University of North Dakota began an
exchange program in Norway in 1982 and I was invited to attend the
first University of North Dakota-University of Oslo Summer School in
Norway that year. As a criminal law and procedure teacher, part-time
municipal judge, and occasional defense lawyer or prosecutor, the only
part of Norwegian law I had heard about was the mandatory jail sentence
for first time drunk drivers. It seemed intuitively likely that such a
sentence, like a song title without the actual music, would be part of a
broader system of law and procedure, which itself would be intricately
connected with a context in Norwegian, Scandinavian, and European
culture.
I was curious about the system and the broader context, although,
like most United States lawyers, I had never studied comparative law as
such (in a course). And yet, United States legal education seems
inherently comparative. Our casebooks are intended to be "national,"
and all law students quickly become accustomed to reading and studying
cases and statutes from virtually any jurisdiction, although they are for
the most part domestic. This is a much different experience from that of
Norwegian law students and, I believe, most European law students. I
never recall any of my teachers, or colleagues after law school, talking
about the "comparative method" in United States legal education. But I
expected the drunk driving law in Norway to be more exotic due to the
language and cultural differences. In essence, then, this article is
serendipitous. I was asked to go to Norway, and DUI was the only aspect
of Norwegian law I had heard about.
One wonders why curiosity must always give way to reform or
critique. After several trips to Norway, I realized that it would take a
long time just to acquire minimal understanding of two new languages:
Norwegian and the language of law in Norway. Lawyers who doubt that
learning law is in many respects learning a new language should think
back to their extensive use of a legal dictionary, especially in the first
year of law school, and to the number of times they read or heard it said
that the goal was to learn to "think like a lawyer," so as to communicate
like a lawyer.
This article, then, reflects the author's attempt to try to understand
and compare how the law deals with drivers who drink in Norway and
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North Dakota. Understanding in some beginning way how the two
approaches compare is reward enough. I find the comparison inherently
interesting (a non-academic could just admit up front that it is fun).
Indeed, after reading many comparative/reform articles, I wonder why it
seems reasonable to learn another language and compare it in many
ways with one's own, without feeling compelled to analyze which
features of one are appropriate for "borrowing" by the other to im-
prove it in some way, but not when the language is law.
Nevertheless, one cannot begin to compare DUI in Norway and the
United States (using North Dakota as an example) without being struck
by the obvious borrowing that has already taken place. North Dakota
after almost fifty years has adopted the per se approach to DUI begun in
Norway. Norway has, long after North Dakota and most of the United
States, begun to use breath testing and is provisionally experimenting
with alcohol treatment programs as an alternative to incarceration.
This comparison, then, might be seen as a partial confirmation of
Richard Frase's premise that transplants are more likely to be attempted
and to succeed in areas of law where the comparative differences are
small, not large.171 In that light, the emphasis of much comparative
criminal law on procedure rather than substantive seems odd. An
American lawyer who merely skims through the Norwegian Criminal
Code will, at least in the post-Model Penal Code world, feel much more
comfortable or "at home" than after a similar quick trip through the
Norwegian Code of Criminal Procedure.
In this initial attempt to understand the differences and broad con-
text of DUI law, I am reluctant to suggest improvements for either
Norway or North Dakota based on borrowing from the other. 172 But
171. See Frase, supra note 8, at 553. Professor Frase recommends that comparative studies
examine individual foreign systems individually rather than in "families" and broadly rather than
focusing on a narrow subject of reform. See Frase, supra note 8, at 553. I have attempted to do so
here. Second, all possible sources should be examined, including formal rules and structures,
impressionistic descriptions of practice, and quantitative data. See Frase, supra note 8. at 553. I have
made some effort to do so, but I confess that I have avoided examination of quantitative data due to an
irrational aversion to numbers. Third, he directs examination of the researcher's own system in both
theory and practice to determine the actual differences from the other system. See Frase, supra note
8, at 553. "Finally, research and reform efforts should concentrate on the smaller differences
between foreign and domestic systems that are revealed by the above approach, since it is the smaller
differences that are most likely to suggest feasible 'borrowings' from abroad." See Frase, supra note
8, at 553.
172. Moreover, I avoid entirely the debate over the effectiveness of legal changes in addressing
the "problem" of drunk driving. Those interested in the broader discussion may usefully consult H.
LAURENCE Ross, Co RONrnm DRUNK DRiVNo 76 (1992). Ross, a leading contributor to the cottage
industry debating policies for fighting drunk driving, devotes only one chapter to "Law and Criminal
Justice." He concludes:
Effective deterrent programs may also require resources at the limit of political
acceptability. It is insufficient merely to up the ante for being caught, if the chances of
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using Professor Frase's insight, I will suggest, for an example, that con-
sideration of the Norwegian-attempt and North Dakota-APC approaches
to the drinker who is not yet driving would be more productive than, for
example, North Dakota's complicated approach to evidence rules, includ-
ing the exclusionary rule and Norway's simpler approach. One need
not travel to Norway to learn that the complexities of our evidence and
procedural rules have exceeded the bounds of both logic and good
sense. 173 Perhaps it is of some use in reform efforts to claim that a "bet-
ter" (or, in this case, "simpler") approach works elsewhere. But a likely
response to those favoring the status quo (and perhaps appropriate in
light of the Frase-proposition) is "that's fine for them, but it wouldn't
work in our system." The purpose here is to explore the differences in
the two systems that might lead to this response.
Major differences may be the most interesting, but if Frase is
correct, they are the least likely candidates for successful borrowing.174
Before differences can be characterized as large or small, they must be
understood and described. Hence this article. Perhaps future work can
expand on this effort, and then proceed to evaluate likely candidates for
borrowing. If this comparison is useful to such projects, so much the
better. For now, Norway's strict punishment of DUI should at least be
better understood as more nuanced than merely long, mandatory jail
sentences, and as part of a system with remarkable differences from
North Dakota's.
apprehension are negligible. Even well conceived and well implemented legal threats
may leave some populations relatively unaffected, and these resistant populations are
likely to be the most dangerous ones. Deterrence thus cannot be the whole of drunk
driving policy. It should be conceived as one element in an arsenal of countermeasures,
along with other measures based on valid understanding of the social causes of the
problem.
Id.
173. See Pizzi, supra note 88.
174. This article for the most part avoids taking a position on the purposes of the provisions it
compares and evaluating whether "borrowing" a corresponding provision from the other country
might better further a particular purpose. Its fundamental goal is to be descriptive, to begin an
internationally comparative picture of how DUI provisions in two jurisdictions interact and compare. I
hope that this comparison is interesting to others, but I admit that further research would provide a
more detailed picture of relevant differences and similarities; e.g. the training and licensing of drivers,
driving conditions and safety provisions, availability of public transportation, alcohol use (or abuse) in
general, and legal issues involving alcohol (such as regulation of alcohol, the drinking age, limits on
sale, civil liability issues, defenses of intoxication in criminal law, and the like). Comparison of law,
like translation, is always imperfect and incomplete. JAmEs BOYD WHrrF, JUs-iCE AS TRANSLATiON 247-
56 (1990).
[VOL. 76:33
